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ments. Such conduct is certainly not entitled to first amendment protection, and its prohibition would not raise overbreadth problems."
It is submitted, however, that the Court's analysis is predicated
upon pragmatic considerations. Confronted with a problem uniquely
local in nature, the Court demonstrated its deference to local interests
by effectively placing the task of defining what sexual performances will
be allowed in bars and nightclubs in the hands of local and state authorities.5 9 Yet significantly it has not closed the door to judicial review, and
its caveat clearly indicates that such state regulation is subject to scrutiny,
at least to the extent that it clearly abuses first amendment rights.
E. R. Harding

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
TION -

-

PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINACOMPULSORY PRODUCTION OF TAXPAYER'S BUSINESS RECORDS

IN THIRD PARTY POSSESSION HELD NOT VIOLATIVE OF TIE FOURTII
AND FIFTH AMENDMENTS.

Couch v. United States (U.S. 1973)
Petitioner Couch challenged the enforcement of an Internal Revenue
Service summons 1 issued to her accountant 2 pursuant to an investigation
58. For example, oral copulation in public clearly lacks the sufficient communicative element necessary for conduct to be entitled to first amendment protection
under the O'Brien rationale. See notes 12-14 and accompanying text supra. Cf.
Hearn v. Short, 327 F. Supp. 33, 35 (S.D. Tex. 1971) (Bue, J., concurring).
59. Subsequently, the Court has indicated that more discretion shall also be
afforded local authorities in the regulation of obscene materials. See Miller v.
,California, 93 S. Ct. 2607 (1973); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 93 S. Ct. 2628
(1973). In the latter case, the Court stated:
The sum of experience, including that of the past two decades, affords an
ample basis for legislatures to conclude that a sensitive, key relationship of
human existence, central to family life, community welfare, and the development
of human personality, can be debased and distorted by crass commercial exploitation of sex. Nothing in the Constitution prohibits a State from reaching
such a conclusion and acting on it legislatively simply because there is no
conclusive evidence or empirical data.
Id. at 2638.
1. The summons was issued pursuant to § 7602 of the INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 7602 which provides in pertinent part:
For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a
return where none has been made, determining the liability of any person for
any internal revenue tax . . . the Secretary or his delegate is authorized1) To examine any books, papers, records or other data which may be
relevant or material to such inquiry;
2) To summon the person liable for tax . . . or any person having
possession, custody, or care of books of account containing entries relating
to the business of the person liable for tax or required to perform the act,
or any other person the Secretary or his delegate may deem proper, to
appear . . . and to produce such books, papers, records, or other data, and
to give such testimony, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such
inquiry . ...

Id.
2. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 323 (1973). Although the summom
was issued to petitioner's accountant, the internal revenue agent learned, on the return
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of her tax liability. She urged that production of records in her accountant's possession3 was prohibited by both the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination and the confidential nature of the accountantclient relationship as protected by the fourth and fifth amendments.
4
The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia
upheld the summons, finding that the fifth amendment privilege was no
bar to its enforcement since the taxpayer was not in possession of the
materials described therein.5 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit affirmed," and the petitioner sought further review.
The United States Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the fifth
amendment did not prohibit the production of petitioner taxpayer's business records by her accountant and that she had no reasonable expectation
of privacy which would bar production under either the fourth or fifth
amendment. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (U.S. 1973).
The origins of the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination
date as far back as William the Conqueror, 7 and even today the privilege,
embodied in our fifth amendment, raises "questions which go to the roots
of our concepts of American criminal jurisprudence."
The policies
behind the privilege were succinctly stated by Mr. Justice Goldberg in
Murphy v. Waterfront Commission :9
date of the summons, that the accountant, at petitioner's request, had delivered the
subpoenaed materials to petitioner's attorney. Id. at 325. The Government then filed
a petition to enforce the summons pursuant to INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7402 which
provides in part:
If any person is summoned under the internal revenue laws to appear, to testify,
or to produce books, papers, or other data, the district court of the United States
for the district in which such person resides or may be found shall have jurisdiction by appropriate process to compel such attendance, testimony, or production
of books, papers, or other data.
Id. § 7402(b).
It was in this setting that petitioner intervened, asserting her fourth amd
fifth amendment claims. 409 U.S. at 325 (1973).
3. More specifically, the petitioner argued that ownership of the subpoenaed
records supported a fifth amendment privilege to bar production by compulsory
process. Even though her records were in the possession of her accountant, the
petitioner maintained they were still her testimony and that if the privilege were
denied in these circumstances, the fifth amendment would have no meaning. Brief
for Petitioner at 12-13, Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
4. The findings of the district court are unreported but are printed in an
appendix submitted to the Court. Appendix at 6, Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322
(1973).
5. The district court did not consider the fourth amendment issues raised by
petitioner since there was no search and seizure involved in the instant case. Id. at 11.
Apparently, the issue of petitioner's right to a confidential accountant-client relationship and any reasonable expectation of privacy deriving therefrom was not fully
developed until the case reached the Supreme Court for the issue was only briefly
mentioned in the opinion of the court of appeals. United States v. Couch, 449 F.2d
141, 143 (4th Cir. 1971), aff'd, 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
6. United States v. Couch, 449 F.2d 141 (4th Cir. 1971).
7. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2250, at 268 (McNaughton rev. 1961) [hereinafter
cited as WIGMORE]. See generally E. GRISWOLD, FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY (1955) ;
Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change,
37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671 (1968).
8. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 439 (1966).
9. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
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It reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble aspirations: our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the
cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of
criminal justice . . . our sense of fair play which dictates "a fair
state-individual balance by requiring the government to leave the individual alone until good cause is shown for disturbing him and by
requiring the government in its contest with the individual to shoulder
the entire load" . . . our respect for the right of each individual "to
a private enclave where he may lead a private life . . ."10
The Supreme Court extended the privilege against self-incrimination to

include a prohibition against the compulsory production of written materials in addition to the traditional proscription against the eliciting of
oral testimony from an accused in Boyd v. United States." The claimant
in Boyd was subpoenaed to produce relevant documents under threat of
prejudicial findings of fact. 12 In upholding his objections, the Court held
that any forced production of books and papers compelled the owner to
be a witness against himself within the meaning of the fifth amendment. 13
Despite the broad language of Boyd, the fifth amendment has not
been uniformly applied as a complete bar to the forced production of
written materials. Generally, the courts have tested the applicability of
the privilege by analyzing the proprietary relationship between the person
asserting it and materials sought to be produced.' 4 While it is fairly
settled that one holding papers for a corporation or unincorporated association cannot invoke the fifth amendment,' 5 the picture is less clear in
10. Id. at 55 (citations omitted).
11. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
12. Id. at 617-18. The case involved the forfeiture of a quantity of glass alleged
to have been illegally imported. The claimants were ordered, pursuant to a federal
statute, to produce an invoice for a prior shipment of glass. Id.
13. Id. at 634-35. Boyd also discussed the fourth amendment implications arising
from the forced production of books and records, and the "intimate relationship"
between the fourth and fifth amendments. Mr. Justice Bradley noted:
[T]he "unreasonable searches and seizures" condemned in the Fourth Amendment are almost always made for the purpose of compelling a man to give
evidence against himself, which . . . is condemned in the Fifth Amendment;
and compelling a man "in a criminal case to be a witness against himself"
. . . throws light on the question as to what is an "unreasonable search and
seizure."
Id. at 633. See Comment, The Fourth and Fifth Amendments - Dimensions of an
"Intimate Relationship," 13 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 857 (1966). This language was the
genesis of the since discarded prohibition against the search and seizure of "mere"
evidence. See note 57 and accompanying text infra.
14. See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 330-32 (1973).
15. See, e.g., Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 382-85 (1911) (corporate
officer may not assert the privilege against self-incrimination to prevent production
of corporate books in his possession) ; Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74 (1906)
(corporation cannot bar production of its records on fifth amendment grounds). The
reasoning behind these decisions is that the privilege against self-incrimination is
personal in nature and therefore cannot be utilized by or on behalf of an organization.
United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699 (1944). The White Court provided a
test to determine the distinction between organizational records held in a representative
capacity as opposed to purely personal records. Records are held representatively
if one can say, considering all the circumstances:
(Tihat a particular type of organization has a character so impersonal in the
scope of its membership and activities that it cannot be said to embody or
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the case of individuals.' 6 For example, the fifth amendment has been
17
held to protect the rights of a non-owner possessor of documents,
whereas the decisions have been mixed in the case of an owner asserting
the privilege to bar production of papers in third party possession.18
Also pertinent in considering governmental access to papers in third
19
party possession is the nature of the accountant-client relationship.
While there was no accountant-client privilege at common law,20 14 states
presently recognize the right to a confidential relationship between an
accountant and his client.2 However, the privilege has not been recognized by the federal courts.2 2 Prior to the instant case, the Supreme Court
had no occasion to examine either the element of possession of written
materials as a requisite for an individual's assertion of a fifth amendment
claim for privilege or the status of the accountant-client relationship.
The petitioner in Couch argued that ownership of materials was
sufficient to invoke the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination since the documents represented her testimony regardless of who
held them at the time they were subpoenaed.2 3 Petitioner relied on the
Boyd reasoning that personal records of an individual are his testimony,
and the fact that the Boyd Court did not condition the application of the
represent the purely private or personal interests of its constituents, but rather
to embody their common or group interests only.
Id. at 701. See Lyon, Government Power And Citizen Rights In A Tax Investigation,
25 TAx LAW. 79, 89 (1971), Note, Civil Versus Criminal: Taxpayer's Rights Under
The Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 38 BROOKLYN L. REV. 130, 136 (1971).
16. See Citizens Rights, supra note 15, at 88.
17. See United States v. Cohen, 388 F.2d 464, 468 (9th Cir. 1967).
18. The claim for privilege was upheld in Stuart v. United States, 416 F.2d 459,
463 (5th Cir. 1969). Contra, Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 458 (1913);
Dorfman v. Rombs, 218 F. Supp. 905, 906 (N.D. Ill. 1963).
As recently as 1971, two cases involving the production of records in a tax
investigation reached different results on similar facts. Compare United States v.
Schoeberlein, 335 F. Supp. 1048, 1055 (D. Md. 1971) (person whose personal records
are in third party possession may not ordinarily bar production by invoking the
fifth amendment) with United States v. Tsukuno, 341 F. Supp. 839, 842 (N.D. Ill.
1971) (fifth amendment rights do not disappear if taxpayer's records are temporarily
out of his possession).
19. Clearly, the relationship is most relevant in the context of the tax investigation. In the tax area, the accountant has been analogized to an interpreter
of a foreign language. See United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 922 (2d Cir. 1961).
20. WIGMORE § 2286, at 530.
21. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32-743 (1956) ; COLO. Rzv. STAT. ANN. § 154-1-7(7)
(1963); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 473.15 (1965); GA. CODE ANN. § 84-216 (1970); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 110'/ § 51 (Smith-Hurd 1966); IOWA CODE ANN. § 116.15 (1946);
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 325.440 (1972); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:85 (1964);
MIcH. CoMp. LAWs ANN. § 338.523 (1957); NEv. REv. STAT. § 49.185 (1971); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 67-23-26 (1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 9.1la (1968); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 62-114 (1955).
The typical statute provides:
A certified public accountant or public accountant shall not be required by any
court to divulge information or evidence which has been obtained by him in his
confidential capacity as such.
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 325.440 (1972).
22. See, e.g., Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734, 739-42 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 864 (1953), Gariepy v. United States, 189 F.2d 459, 463-64 (6th
Cir. 1951). See generally WIGMORE § 2286, at 530 n.13; Annot., 38 A.L.R.2d 670
(1954).
23. Brief for Petitioner at 12-13, Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss1/6
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fifth amendment on actual location. 24 The Couch Court had no difficulty
distinguishing Boyd, 25 observing that Boyd did not deal with a factual
setting in which ownership did not coincide with possession, and pointing to lower court decisions which considered the importance of possession
in analyzing a fifth amendment claim.2 The Court also relied upon its
rationale in United States v. White,27 wherein it upheld the contempt
conviction of a union officer for failing to produce union records subpoenaed in the course of a grand jury investigation. 2 In answer to the
argument that a union officer had a valid fifth amendment privilege to
bar the enforcement of a subpoena of union records that would tend to
incriminate him, 29 the White Court stated that the privilege was designed
to prevent legal process from compelling oral testimony from an accused
or from forcing him to produce any potentially incriminating personal
documents.30 The Couch majority extended White to the instant situation
where no corporation or unincorporated association was involved and
emphasized the personal nature of the privilege. The Court concluded
that possession would best serve as the boundary for the privilege since
that factor best relates to the presence of the personal compulsion abhorred
by the fifth amendment. 3' Although Mr. Justice Powell, writing for the
Court, never stated precisely how possession "best relates" to the element
of compulsion, he seemed to reason that it is the person to whom a subpoena is directed who will be subject to the choice of producing documents and being incriminated, or refusing and being subject to contempt.
Thus, the Court adhered to Mr. Justice Holmes' maxim that "[a] party is
32
privileged from producing the evidence but not from its production.1
It seems clear that the Court's major concern in Couch was with
the ability of Internal Revenue agents to effectively investigate possible
24. Id. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 661 (1886).

See also notes

11-13 and accompanying text suprs.
25. 409 U.S. at 330. The Couch majority, in rejecting petitioner's interpretation
of Boyd, seemed to impliedly accept Dean Wigmore's theory that when a person
prodces potentially incriminating evidence in response to a subpoena, the evidence

brought forth is in reality the evidence demanded and therein lies the self-incrimination. Hence,
the onlySee
possible
asserter
of atthe384-85.
privilege
the note
one 66
to and
whom
subpoena
is directed.
WIGMORE
§ 2264,
Seeisalso
accomthe

panying text

_Wfra.

26. 409 U.S, at 330. See, e.g., United States v. Cohen, 388 F.2d 464 (9th Cir.
1967) ; United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963).
27. 322 U.S. 694 (1944). See note 15 supra.
28. 322 U.S. at 704.
29. Id. at 698.
30. Id.
31. 409 U.S. at 331. The Court emphasized the fact that the privilege against
self-incrimination attaches to the person and not to the potentially incriminating
information sought; therefore, the owner of the subpoenaed materials may not, as
in this case, be compelled to do anything. The Court noted the person to whom the
subpoena was issued - petitioner's accountant - asserted no fifth amendment claim.
Id. at 328-29.
32. Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 458 (1913). Here the Court held
that a bankrupt's books and records, which were in the possession of a trustee in
bankruptcy, could be entered into evidence against the bankrupt in a subsequent
criminal prosecution. Id. The case is distinguishable from Couch because the trustee
had both title and possession, but the Court in the instant case interpreted the crucial
aspect in the transfer in Johnson to be the removal of the element of personal comPublished bypulsion
Villanova
School
of Lawself-incrimination.
Digital Repository, 1973
as University
it appliesCharles
to theWidger
privilege
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409 U.S. at 322 n.14.
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violations of the tax laws.33 Petitioner sought to have the privilege
against self-incrimination available to any owner of books and records,
regardless of who was compelled to produce them.3 4 The Couch majority
rejected this argument, stating that the fifth amendment protects against
certain methods of obtaining incriminating information as well as protecting the person from whom it is obtained.35 However, while recognizing
that divulgence of the instant records might have incriminated the petitioner, the Court reasoned that "such divulgence, where it did not coerce
the accused herself, is a necessary part of the process of law enforcement and tax investigation. "36 Thus, the Court characterized petitioner's
argument as tending to extend constitutional protections "in the very
situation where obligations of disclosure exist and under a system largely
dependent upon honest self-reporting even to survive. 37
Despite those policy considerations, the import of the Court's position, that possession of papers is a fifth amendment requisite, may not be
confined to tax investigations; one's personal records may commonly be
in possession of such other parties as bankers, employers, trustees, and
attorneys.3 8 Since the Court attached "constitutional importance to possession.., because of its close relationship to those personal compulsions and
intrusions which the Fifth Amendment forbids,"3 9 such papers in the
hands of any third party may now be beyond the pale of fifth amendment
protection. However, Mr. Justice Powell expressly stated that the instant
decision did not establish a per se constitutional rule. 40 He indicated
that a factual setting may arise in which clear constructive possession
or temporary loss of possession may leave intact the element of compulsion on the accused owner of the subpoenaed materials. 41
33. 409 U.S. at 329, 336. The Court has recently expanded the summons power
of the Internal Revenue Service in two notable cases. In United States v. Powell,
379 U.S. 48 (1964), the Court held there need be no showing of probable cause to
authorize enforcement of an Internal Revenue summons. Id. at 51. However, it was
also noted that the Commissioner must be able to demonstrate that the investigation
was instituted pursuant to a proper purpose. Id. at 57-58. The scope of issuance for
a "proper" purpose was liberally construed to be issuance in good faith prior to a
recommendation for criminal prosecution. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517,
536 (1971).

See generally Citizen Rights, supra note 15.

34. 409 U.S. at 331.
35. Id. at 328.
36. Id. at 329.
37. Id. at 335.
38. Although a valid claim to the attorney-client privilege may be asserted,
the taxpayer's books and records may not constitute a privileged communication if

they fall within the "pre-existing document" exception to the attorney-client privilege
which excludes documents created prior to the attorney-client relationship. See

Note, The Attorney and His Client's Privileges, 74 YALE L.J. 539, 546-50 (1965).
Cf. Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734, 738-39 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
864 (1953).
39. 409 U.S. at 336 n.20. Although the Conch decision rested in part on the
policy of effective tax investigations, the Supreme Court has recently stressed the
necessity for wide-ranging grand jury investigations to uphold the interest in effective
enforcement of our criminal laws. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690 (1972).
40. 409 U.S. at 333, 336 n.20.
41. Id. at 333.
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In United States v. Guterma,42 the Second Circuit upheld a taxpayer's assertion of the fifth amendment privilege against production of
personal records stored in a corporate office. The fact that the records
were kept in a safe to which the taxpayer alone had access was crucial to
the court's conclusion that, even though the subpoena was directed to the
corporation's trustee, the factual setting so clearly resembled service upon
the taxpayer himself to produce records in his own possession that to
deny him his privilege against self-incrimination would be honoring
form over substance. 43 Petitioner urged Guterma as supporting her position that ownership should mark the border for fifth amendment invoca44
tions to prevent the production of records in third party possession.
The government responded by asserting that Guterma was distinguishable
from the instant factual setting as involving custodial safekeeping of
records as opposed to a transfer of possession for the purpose of disclosing information to the third party. 45 The Court rejected the former
argument 46 and refused to assess the merits of the latter, 47 thus regrettably setting no discernible standards to limit the application of its decision.
Justice Brennan, concurring, 48 noted this lack of precision by the majority and opined that the privilege should be available (1) to one who
turns records over to a third party for custodial safekeeping, 49 (2) to
one who turns records over to a third party at the government's inducement, 50 or (3) in any case where reasonable steps have been taken to
insure the confidentiality of the records.3 '
Despite the Court's vague attempt to limit its holding, the impact of
Couch will be widespread in the tax area alone. The petitioner stressed
that the increasing complexity of the tax laws dictated that taxpayers
seek the professional help of accountants in preparing returns, 52 and
42. 272 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1959).
43. Id. at 346. See also Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855, 860-61 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956).
44. Brief for Petitioner at 15-16, Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
45. Brief for Respondent at 21, Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
46. See notes 25-32 and accompanying text supra.
47. 409 U.S. at 334 n.16.
48. Id. at 337 (Brennan, J., concurring).
49. Id. See note 44 and accompanying text supra.
50. 409 U.S. at 337 (Brennan, J., concurring). See, e.g., Stuart v. United States,
416 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1969). In Stuart, a summons was issued to an accountant
ordering him to produce appellant-taxpayer's records in his possession. Appellant
usually kept the records at her place of business but she had transferred them
to her accountant to facilitate a revenue agent's civil investigation of her return.
After indications of possible fraud were discovered, a special agent entered the
case, gave appellant her Miranda warnings, and served a summons upon appellant's
accountant who refused to comply. Id. at 460-61. In upholding appellant's claim
that the fifth amendment barred production of her records, the court noted the
relevancy of how the records came into the accountant's hands, and considered the
"critical fact" to be that the records were placed in the accountant's custody
primarily for the investigating agent's convenience. Id. at 462-63.
51. 409 U.S. at 337 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan provided the
example of the Government issuing a subpoena for records which an individual
placed in a safety deposit box. Id.
52. Brief for Petitioner at 21-22, Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
Justice Douglas, dissenting, viewed this point as crucial. He reasoned that, if
his rightCharles
to theWidger
assistance
in preparing
Published byforegoing
Villanova University
Schoolofof an
Lawaccountant
Digital Repository,
1973 a tax return is
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argued that the confidential nature of the accountant-client relationship,
with its resulting expectation of privacy in the transferred records,
prohibited their production under the fourth and fifth amendments. 5
Justice Douglas agreed, asserting that the Boyd Court, in deciding that
the fifth amendment applied to the forcible production of private papers, 54
laid down substantial fourth amendment proscriptions as well, effectively
combining the fourth and fifth amendments to create a "sphere of
privacy" which must be protected against governmental intrusion.5 5 The
majority, however, distinguished Boyd as a pre-income tax case, and
disposed of the privacy issue in nearly summary fashion, reasoning that
there can be little expectation of privacy where records are transferred
to an accountant with the knowledge that much of the information is
required to be disclosed by the income tax laws. 56
It is now clear that when papers held in third party possession are
reccras to be utilized in a tax return, the owner cannot avail himself of
fourth amendment protection against disclosure of their contents. The
Court took a "realistic" view of petitioner's fourth amendment argument,
preferring to focus on the implications of petitioner's privacy argument
to the income tax system rather than on the private relationship between
a taxpayer and his accountant. The majority felt that the governmental
interest in effective enforcement of the tax laws outweighed any incidental
infringement on the privacy of the accountant or client. It is submitted
that the Court's reasoning is sound in the tax records context; the
acknowledgement of a right to privacy between the accountant and his
client could create a constitutionally protected haven for tax evaders.57
the only way to protect his records from the subpoena power, a taxpayer would be
unconstitutionally penalized for exercising his fourth and fifth amendment rights.
409 U.S. at 342 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The Couch majority ignored this point.
Regardless of the validity of Douglas's analysis, the Court seemed unconcerned with
the impact of its decision on such a widespread practice. The Court's attitude reflected its strong feelings toward effective enforcement of the tax laws. See note
56 and accompanying text infra.
53. 409 U.S. at 335.
54. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
55. 409 U.S. at 339-40 (Douglas, J., dissenting). See note 13 supra.
56. 409 U.S. at 335. The Court's conclusion that there can be no reasonable
expectation of privacy is based upon its analysis of the accountant-client relationship.
The Court viewed as significant the fact that petitioner realized that much of the
information in the transferred records was required to be disclosed in his tax
return and that the accountant would disclose in his discretion. Id. Justice Douglas
viewed the relationship differently, reasoning that an accountant is an agent for one
special purpose, bearing fiduciary responsibilities to the taxpayer, including the duty
to refrain from using the records transferred for any purpose other than completion of
the tax return. Douglas thus concluded that a transfer of records to an accountant
does not commit them to the public domain. 409 U.S. at 340. Although there is
no accountant-client privilege at federal law, see note 22 and accompanying text
supra, Justice Douglas would have protected the business records in the instant case
on general fourth amendment privacy grounds which provide that an individual
would have freedom in selecting the circumstances under which he will share
secrets with others. 409 U.S. at 340-43. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 323
(1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Douglas' view of privacy rights was not discussed by the Couch majority.
Rather than focusing on the relationship of two people, the Court viewed those two
people only as they interacted with the income tax system.
57. It is not contended that the existence of an accountant-client privilege would
make it impossible for the government to prove fraud in a given case, but that proof

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss1/6
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Hopefully, however, the Court's light treatment of the "reasonable expectation of privacy" concept and its failure to use well defined standards in
5
its application will not be extended to other written materials. " Fortunately, Couch seems confined to its facts due to the Court's treatment of
the fourth amendment ramifications of the accountant-client relationship.
It is apparent that the Court did not intend to lay down a rule that an
owner of materials transferred to a third party can never have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their contents. 9
Couch may shed some light on the currently contested question of
the constitutional limitations upon the use of a search warrant to seize
books and records in the taxpayer's possession." An outgrowth of Boyd
was the recently repudiated rule that a search, reasonable by fourth
amendment standards, could not extend to the seizure of "mere evi61
dence" but was limited to the "fruits" or "instrumentalities" of a crime.
This doctrine was abandoned in Warden v. Hayden,6 2 where the Supreme
Court held that an authorized search and seizure could include items
usable as evidence against the accused. 6 3 Warden, however, specifically
left open the question of whether the seizure of an item which was
"testimonial or communicative" in character was protected by the fifth
64
amendment from an otherwise reasonable search.
of tax evasion would be considerably more difficult than in the absence of such
a privilege. For example, a taxpayer and his accountant conspiring to evade the
tax laws create two sets of records. One, a falsified set, would remain in the
taxpayer's possession. The other, an accurate set, would be retained by the accountant.
Upon any investigation into the taxpayer's possible tax fraud, only the falsified
records would be readily available to the investigating agents by a search warrant.
Any papers held by the accountant would be privileged. Of course, the accountantclient privilege would not extend so far as to cover a conspiracy between the parties,
but the government would first have to show some tangible evidence of conspiracy
before the privilege could be pierced.
58. The concept of a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in determining fourth
amendments rights was established in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360
(1967). Justice Harlan's concurring opinion enumerated factors to consider in
assessing the reasonableness of one's subjective expectation of privacy. 389 U.S. at
361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Adapting these factors to judge one's expectation
of privacy in respect to written records, the criteria would seem to be: (1) the
nature of the writing - whether a person generally would regard it to be private;
(2) whether the owner has allowed others to view the contents; and (3) the
precautions taken by the owner to protect the privacy of the papers. See Comment,
Protection of the Right of Privacy in One's Personal Papers, 1970 L. & Soc. ORDER
269, 275-76 (1970) ; Note, From Private Places to Personal Privacy: A Post-Katf
Study of Fourth Amendment Protection, 43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 968, 982-86 (1968).
Mr. Justice Marshall criticized the majority in the instant case for not
developing standards to aid in the determination of what is a reasonable expectation
of privacy when one transfers records to a third party. 409 U.S. at 344-45 (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
59. 409 U.S. at 335-36.
60. See Citizen Rights, supranote 15, at 96.
61. The Boyd Court instituted the consideration of property concepts in analyzing
whether or not a search and seizure was reasonable. 116 U.S. at 623. See notes 11-13
and accompanying text supra. In Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921),
where it formally established the "mere evidence" rule, the Court interpreted Boyd
as standing for the proposition that a search warrant may be used only when the
public or complainant has a superior property right in the seized materials - that
is when the property is the instrumentality or fruit of a crime. Id. at 309.
62. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
63. Id. at 310.
64. Id. at 302-03.
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

In United States v. Blank,65 the Sixth Circuit upheld the use of a
search warrant to seize books and records, distinguishing the use of a
subpoena for the same purpose in that the latter contains an element of
compulsion, while the owner is required to do nothing incriminating in
the former procedure. 66 The Blank court accepted the view that, after
Warden, the limits on the use of the search warrants will be judged by
focusing on the invasion of an individual's privacy rather than the nature
of the items seized. 6 7 The opposite result, however, was reached by the
Seventh Circuit in Hill v. Philpott68 where the court suppressed books and
records seized under an otherwise valid search warrant. Warden was
interpreted as not diminishing "fifth amendment characteristics which
might attach to certain items of property." 69 The court rejected Dean
Wigmore's theory that the fifth amendment does not apply to the use
of a search warrant because, unlike the subpoena, the element of compulsion is lacking where it is not the accused's oath which must prove the
authenticity of the materials seized. 70 Regardless of where proof of
authenticity is derived, the jury would realize that the records belong to
the accused and his entries would "speak against him as clearly as his
'71
own voice."
Implicit in Couch's conclusion that compulsion is lacking when
records are subpoenaed from third party possession is a rejection of the
Seventh Circuit's reasoning that the contents of the records speak against
72
the accused. Indeed, the instant petitioner argued that precise point.
Emanating from the Court's opinion in Couch is the necessity, in a valid
fifth amendment claim, for compulsion in a physical sense - the selfproduction of the records which subjects the accused to the "crueltrilemma" of self-accusation, perjury, and contempt.7" It would seem
to follow from Couch's analysis that this crucial element of compulsion
would be lacking in the search warrant procedure where the accused
must merely watch as a search is being conducted. 74 Thus, while the use
65. 459 F.2d 383 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972).
66. Id. at 385. See Duke, Prosecutions for Attempts to Evade Income Tax:
A Discordant View of a Procedural Hybrid, 76 YALE L.J. 1, 46-47 (1966).
67. 459 F.2d at 385. This analysis was articulated by the Second Circuit in a
prosecution for conspiracy to import narcotics illegally. The court upheld the
seizure of an incriminating letter written by one of the defendants, but noted that
the fifth amendment would have prohibited the use of a subpoena to produce the

same information in the letter because of its testimonial nature. United States v.
Bennet, 409 F.2d 888, 896 (2d Cir. 1969).
68. 445 F.2d 144 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971). Hill concerned
a tax fraud investigation where the seizure included a "truckload" of the defendants'
financial and business records. Id. at 145.
69. Id. at 148.
70. Id. Wigmore has concluded that:
[Piroof of their [the seized materials'] authenticity, or other circumstances
affecting them, may and must be made by the testimony of other persons, without
any employment of the accused's oath or testimonial responsibility.

§ 2264, at 380.
71. 445 F.2d at 149.
72. See Brief for Petitioner at 13-14, Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322
(1973).
73. See 378 U.S. at 55.
74. In a post-Couch decision, the Ninth Circuit suppressed the seizure of a
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss1/6
defendant's books and records in a tax investigation strikingly similar to the facts
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of search warrants in tax investigations has been rare because of the
difficulty of showing probable cause,7 5 the search warrant may become
more common, after Couch, in obtaining books and records in the possession of the taxpayer which cannot be subpoenaed directly due to the
76
privilege against self-incrimination.
In the final analysis, Couch seems to reach the correct result on its
facts. 77 It is submitted, however, that the Court was too brief in its
examination of the constitutional claims before it, for its opinion ignored
too many of the factors 78 which should have been considered in any
analysis of constitutional issues of such widespread import. In upholding
the interest of the Internal Revenue Service in obtaining wide investigatory powers for its agents, the Couch Court has demonstrated a lack of
sensitivity toward the rights of the individual.
Douglas Paul Coopersmith
in Hill. Vonder Ahe v. Howland ,..
F.2d ---- (9th Cir. 1973). The distinction
between acquiring records via subpoena and search warrant was rejected as the
court followed Hill's rationale. Couch was cited by the Ninth Circuit for the
proposition that the "testimonial compulsion" against the defendant violated that
"'private inner sanctum of individual feeling and thought' which the Fifth Amendment
seeks to protect." Id. at
It is submitted that the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Couch is faulty.
In finding a fifth amendment violation, the Vonder Ahe opinion utilized the following
language from Hill:
The jury knows the books and records belong to the defendant and the entries
he has made therein speak against him as clearly as his own voice. This seems
particularly true in a prosecution for violation of the income tax laws.
F.2d at
-----.. , citing Hill v. Philpott, 445 F.2d 144, (7th Cir. 1971). If the Couch
Court accepted the notion that "the entries . . . speak against him as clearly as his
own voice," then of what significance is possession of any written materials sought
by subpoena as was the issue in Couch? It would seem that documents written by
an accused which are produced by subpoena would speak against him in violation of
the fifth amendment regardless of who possessed the writings.
As noted above, the court in Vonder Ahe, citing Couch, opined that the
seizure of financial and business records violated that "private inner sanctum of
individual feeling and thought." ..... F.2d at .-.
It would be strange indeed if
the Court could hold in Couch that business records in the accountant's hands yield
no reasonable expectation of privacy (especially where disclosures of much of that
information is mandated by the tax laws), and also find that where the same records
are retained by the taxpayer, they are in the "private inner sanctum of individual feeling
and thought." See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 327, 335 (1973).
75. See Citizens Rights, supra note 15, at 96.
76. If Couch is in fact interpreted as to permit a search and seizure of one's
tax records, it would seem that the use of a search warrant would be permissible to
seize materials written by the accused in other areas of criminal activity. The
focus would then be on whether the seized materials were so private in nature as
to be precluded from a search on fourth amendment grounds. See notes 61 & 62 and
accompanying text supra.
77. Petitioner in the instant case left her business records in her accountant's
office for some 15 years and thereafter exercised little control over them. 409 U.S.
at 334. This seems far from the case where the accountant had "naked" possession
of the records.
78. See notes 46, 51 and 55-56 and accompanying text supra. Justice Douglas,
in reflecting on this part of the opinion, stated:
We are told that "situations may well arise where . . . the relinquishment of
possession is too temporary and insignificant as to leave personal compulsions
upon the accused substantially intact." I can see no basis in the majority
opinion, however, for stopping short of condemning only those intrusions resting
on compulsory
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